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To protect processor logic from soft errors, 
multicore redundant architectures execute two copies 
of a program on separate cores of a chip 
multiprocessor (CMP). Maintaining identical 
instruction streams is challenging because redundant 
cores operate independently, yet must still receive the 
same inputs (e.g., load values and shared-memory 
invalidations). Past proposals strictly replicate load 
values across two cores, requiring significant changes 
to the highly-optimized core. 
We make the key observation that, in the common 
case, both cores load identical values without special 
hardware. When the cores do receive different load 
values (e.g., due to a data race), the same mechanisms 
employed for soft error detection and recovery can 
correct the difference. This observation permits 
designs that relax input replication, while still 
providing correct redundant execution. In this paper, 
we present Reunion, an execution model that provides 
relaxed input replication and preserves the existing 
memory interface, coherence protocols, and 
consistency models. We evaluate a CMP-based 
implementation of the Reunion execution model with 
full-system, cycle-accurate simulation. We show that 
the performance overhead of relaxed input replication 
is only 5% and 6% for commercial and scientific 
workloads, respectively. 
1.  Introduction
Chip multiprocessors (CMPs) have emerged as a 
promising approach to give computer architects scal-
able performance and reasonable power consumption 
within a single chip [3,11,16]. However, increasing 
levels of integration, diminishing node capacitance, 
and reduced noise margins have led researchers to fore-
cast an exponential increase in the soft-error rate for 
unprotected logic and flip-flop circuits [10,19]. Recent 
work [9,14,22] advocates leveraging the inherent repli-cation of processor cores in a CMP for soft-error toler-
ant redundant execution by pairing cores and checking 
their execution results. 
Because CMP designs maintain the familiar 
shared-memory programming model, multicore redun-
dant architectures must provide correct and efficient 
execution of multithreaded programs and operating 
systems. Furthermore, redundant execution must not 
introduce significant complexity over a non-redundant 
design. Ideally, a single design can provide a dual-use 
capability by supporting both redundant and non-
redundant execution.
Redundant designs must solve two key problems: 
maintaining identical instruction streams and detecting 
divergent execution. Mainframes, which have provided 
fault tolerance for decades, solve these problems by 
tightly lockstepping two executions [4,20]. Lockstep 
ensures both processors observe identical load values, 
cache invalidations, and external interrupts. While con-
ceptually simple, lockstep becomes an increasing bur-
den as device scaling continues [5,12].
Researchers have proposed several alternatives to 
lockstep within the context of CMPs. Both Mukherjee 
et al. [14] and Gomaa et al. [9] use a custom load-value 
queue (LVQ) to guarantee that redundant executions 
always see an identical view of memory. A leading 
core directly issues loads to the memory system, while 
a trailing core consumes a record of load values from 
the LVQ. Although the LVQ produces an identical 
view of memory for both executions, integrating this 
strict input replication into an out-of-order core 
requires significant changes to existing highly-opti-
mized microarchitectures [14].
Strict input replication forbids using existing 
cache hierarchies for the redundant execution and 
requires changes to critical components of the proces-
sor core and cache hierarchy. In contrast, relaxed input 
replication permits redundant executions to indepen-
dently issue memory operations to existing cache hier-
archies. We observe that, even for shared-memory 
parallel programs, relaxed input replication produces 
the correct result in virtually all cases. In the case when 
load values differ between the redundant cores, called 
input incoherence, mechanisms for soft error detection 
and recovery can correct the difference [17]. 
In this paper, we propose the Reunion execution 
model, which exploits relaxed input replication for 
soft-error tolerant redundant execution across cores. 
While Reunion allows redundant cores to issue mem-
ory operations independently, we prove that Reunion 
designs can maintain correct execution with existing 
coherence protocols and memory consistency models. 
Reunion provides detection and recovery from input 
incoherence using a combination of light-weight error 
detection [21] and existing precise exception roll-
back—the same mechanisms needed for soft-error tol-
erance.
We make the following contributions:
• Input incoherence detection. We observe that 
light-weight detection mechanisms for soft errors can 
also detect input incoherence. This observation enables 
a single recovery strategy for both soft errors and input 
incoherence.
• Reunion execution model. We present formal 
requirements for correct redundant execution using 
relaxed input replication in a multiprocessor. These 
requirements do not change the existing coherence pro-
tocol or memory consistency model. 
• Serializing check overhead. We observe that 
checking execution at instruction retirement incurs 
stalls on serializing events, such as traps, memory bar-
riers, and non-idempotent instructions. Architectures 
that encounter frequent serializing events will suffer a 
substantial performance loss with any checking 
microarchitecture.
We evaluate Reunion in a cycle-accurate full-sys-
tem CMP simulator. We show that the Reunion execu-
tion model has an average 9% and 8% performance 
impact on commercial and scientific workloads, 
respectively, with a 5-6% performance overhead from 
relaxed input replication.
Paper Outline. In Section 2 we present back-
ground on soft error detection and redundant execu-
tion. Section 3 presents the Reunion execution model. 
We discuss a CMP implementation in Section 4 and its 
evaluate performance in Section 5. We conclude in 
Section 6. 
2.  Background
2.1.  Fault Model
Our fault model targets soft errors that cause silent 
data corruption, such as transient bit flips from cosmic rays or alpha particles. We assume that the processor’s 
datapath is vulnerable to soft errors from fetch to 
retirement, but that the less-vulnerable control 
logic [19] is protected by circuit-level techniques. 
Designers already protect cache arrays and critical 
communication buses with information redundancy 
(e.g., ECC) [20]. However, the complex layout and 
timing-critical nature of high-performance processor 
datapaths precludes these codes within the pipeline. 
Unretired speculative state, such as speculative register 
files and the issue queue, can remain unprotected. 
However, we require retired architectural state arrays 
to have ECC protection (e.g., the architectural register 
file and non-speculative store buffer).
In this work, we investigate microarchitectures 
that detect and recover from virtually all soft errors, but 
in very infrequent cases, can leave them undetected or 
uncorrected. Architects design microprocessors to 
meet soft error budgets [13] and our design can be 
engineered to meet the desired budget.
2.2.  Redundant Execution
The “sphere of replication” defines three general 
design requirements for all systems with redundant 
execution [17]. First, all computation within the sphere 
must be replicated. Second, all inputs entering the 
sphere must be replicated for each execution. Finally, 
all outputs leaving the sphere must be checked to pre-
vent errors from propagating outside the sphere.
We now discuss the two dominant forms of redun-
dant execution in microprocessors in the industry and 
research communities: lockstep and multithreading.
Lockstep. Classical lockstep redundant execu-
tion—where identical processing elements are tightly-
coupled on a cycle-by-cycle basis—has long existed in 
mainframes such as HP NonStop [4] and IBM 
zSeries [20]. However, lockstep in general-purpose 
execution encounters significant roadblocks in future 
process technologies. First, individual cores are likely 
to operate in separate clock domains for dynamic fre-
quency control, while execution must still match pre-
cisely in time despite asynchronous inputs and physical 
distances between the cores [5,12]. Second, increasing 
within-die device- and circuit-level variability [6] leads
to deviations from precise lockstep because, even in 
the absence of errors, cores will no longer have identi-
cal timing properties or execution resources. Third, 
lockstep requires precise determinism and identical ini-
tialization across all processor components, including 
in units that do not affect architecturally-correct execu-
tion (e.g., branch predictors [15]). As a result, redun-
dant execution models that avoid lockstep are highly 
desirable.
Multithreading. Recent proposals investigate 
using independent redundant threads within a simulta-
neous multithreaded (SMT) core [17,23] or across 
cores in a CMP [9,14,22]. Unlike lockstep, the threads 
execute independently and are bound by architectural 
requirements rather than microarchitectural timing 
constraints. Threads synchronize as outputs from the 
core (e.g., store values or register updates) are com-
pared but remain coupled within a short distance to 
limit the storage needed for input replication and out-
put comparison. 
2.3.  Input Incoherence
Multithreading introduces a problem for redundant 
execution because the threads independently execute 
and issue redundant memory requests. When executing 
shared-memory parallel programs, the threads can 
observe different values for the same dynamic load—
which we term input incoherence—due to data races. 
Figure 1 illustrates this situation: these races arise 
between one execution's read of a cache block and the 
redundant partner's corresponding read. Writes from 
competing cores will cause input incoherence. This 
occurs in ordinary code such as spin-lock routines. 
To avoid input incoherence, several prior propos-
als [9,14,17,23] enforce strict input replication across 
the redundant threads, where a leading execution 
defines the load values observed by both executions. 
Strict input replication can be achieved by either lock-
ing cache blocks or recording load values. 
The active load address buffer (ALAB) [17] tracks 
cache blocks loaded by the leading thread and prevents 
their replacement until the trailing thread retires its cor-
responding load. The ALAB adds multiported storage 
arrays to track accessed cache blocks, logic to defer 
invalidations and replacements, and deadlock detection 
and retry mechanisms. The ALAB must be accessed on 
each load and external coherence request and requires 
Figure 1. Input incoherence: redundant cores P0 
and P0’ observe different values for memory 
location M[A] from an intervening store. 
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interface and pipeline control logic.
The LVQ is a FIFO structure, originally proposed 
as a simpler alternative to the ALAB, that records load 
values in program order from a leading execution and 
replays them for the trailing execution [17]. The LVQ 
requires modifications to the existing, heavily-opti-
mized processor/cache interface. The trailing thread 
must bypass the cache and store buffer interface in 
favor of the LVQ, which adds bypass paths on the load 
critical path. Furthermore, the trailing thread only 
reads values in program order, which is a major policy 
change in front-end and out-of-order scheduling logic. 
The alternative—an out-of-order issue LVQ—elimi-
nates the scheduling restriction, but has a similar com-
plexity and area overhead as a multiported store 
buffer [14]. Finally, the LVQ also reduces error cover-
age of memory operations: there is no way to verify 
that load bypassing and forwarding completed cor-
rectly because the trailing execution relies upon lead-
ing thread load values. 
Alternatively, in relaxed input replication, redun-
dant threads independently send load requests to 
caches and store buffers, as in a non-redundant design. 
This avoids the added complexity of strict input repli-
cation and also provides detection for soft errors in 
load forwarding and bypass logic. However, this means 
that redundant executions are susceptible to input inco-
herence.
There are two general methods for tolerating input 
incoherence in relaxed input replication: robust for-
ward recovery and rollback recovery. Prior work 
entrusts a robust checker to resolve input incoherence. 
For example, DIVA checkers with dedicated caches [8] 
and slipstreamed re-execution [25] both allow the lead-
ing thread’s load values to differ from the trailing 
threads’. However, these proposals do not address the 
possibility of data races in shared-memory multipro-
cessors and require complex additions to support 
robust redundant execution. Alternatively, the naive 
rollback solution—simply retrying upon error detec-
tion—uses existing hardware support, but offers no 
forward progress guarantee. Because incoherent cache 
state or races may persist in the memory system, the 
same incoherent situation can occur again during re-
execution. The Reunion execution model addresses 
this problem.
2.4.  Output Comparison
The sphere of replication’s boundary determines 
where outputs are compared. Two main choices have 
been studied in CMPs: (1) comparing outputs before 
the architectural register file (ARF), and (2) comparing 
before the L1 cache [9,14]. In both cases, stores and 
uncached load addresses require comparison. For 
detection before the ARF, each instruction result must 
also be compared. We limit our study to systems with 
comparison before the ARF because existing precise 
exception support can then be used to recover before 
outputs become visible to other processors.
Output comparison impacts retirement. Serializing 
instructions, such as traps, memory barriers, and non-
idempotent instructions, stall further execution until 
the serializing instruction has been compared. Both 
executions must complete and compare the serializing 
instruction before continuing. 
Comparison bandwidth is another design factor in 
superscalar processors because multiple instructions 
may need comparison each cycle. Prior work proposes 
techniques to reduce bandwidth requirements. Gomaa 
et al. compare only instructions that end dependence 
chains in a lossless detection scheme [9]. They report 
bandwidth savings of roughly twenty percent over 
directly comparing each instruction result. 
Smolens et al. [21] propose compressing architec-
tural state updates into a signature called a fingerprint. 
Fingerprints lower comparison bandwidth by orders of 
magnitude with a negligible loss in error coverage. We 
extend this work to include two-stage compression that 
can match the retirement bandwidth of a wide super-
scalar (where the amount of data retired per cycle is 
larger than feasible hash circuits can consume).
3.  Reunion Execution Model
This section presents a formal set of requirements 
for the Reunion execution model. The requirements 
provide redundant execution and relaxed input replica-
tion and allows reasoning about correctness indepen-
dent of implementation. Figure 2 illustrates the 
concepts in this section.
3.1.  System Definition
Definition 1 (Logical processor pair). A logical pro-
cessor pair consists of two processor cores that execute 
the same instruction stream. To provide a single output 
from the sphere of replication, the logical processor 
pair presents itself as a single entity to the system.
We differentiate the two cores as follows:
Definition 2 (Vocal and mute cores). Each logical pro-
cessor pair consists of one vocal and one mute core. 
The vocal core exposes updated values to the system 
and strictly abides by the coherence and memory con-sistency requirements specified by the baseline system. 
The mute core never exposes updates to the system.
Vocal and mute cores use their existing private 
cache hierarchies and on-chip coherence protocol as in 
a non-redundant design. Definition 2 permits the mute 
core to write values into its private cache hierarchy, 
provided these values are not communicated to other 
caches or main memory.
Reunion uses redundant execution to detect and 
recover from soft errors that occur in program execu-
tion. We formally define safe execution as follows:
Definition 3 (Safe execution). Program execution is 
“safe” if and only if (1) all updates to architecturally-
defined state are free of soft error effects, (2) all mem-
ory accesses are coherent with the global memory 
image, and (3) the execution abides by the baseline 
memory consistency model. Execution that is not safe 
is deemed “unsafe”.
The state that results from safe execution is:
Definition 4 (Safe state). The architectural state 
defined by the vocal core at a specific point in time is 
considered “safe state” if and only if it is free of soft 
errors; otherwise, the architectural state is deemed 
“unsafe state”.
3.2.  Execution Model
Definition 2 requires that only the vocal abide by 
coherence and consistency requirements. Ideally, the 
mute core always loads coherent data values. However, 
precisely tracking coherent state for both vocal and 
mute would be prohibitively complex (e.g., the coher-
ence protocol would have to track two owners for 
exclusive/modified blocks).
Instead, Reunion maintains coherence for cache 
blocks in vocal caches, while allowing incoherence in 
mute caches. The mechanism for reading cache blocks 
into the mute cache hierarchy is the phantom request, a 
non-coherent memory request:
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Figure 2. The Reunion architecture.
Definition 5 (Phantom request). A phantom request 
returns a value for the requested block without chang-
ing coherence state in the memory system. 
The phantom request does not guarantee that the 
mute core will be coherent with the vocal, potentially 
leading to input incoherence within a logical processor 
pair:
Definition 6 (Input incoherence). Input incoherence 
results when the same dynamic load on vocal and mute 
cores returns different values.
Reunion requires vocal and mute to compare exe-
cution results as follows:
Definition 7 (Output comparison). Vocal and mute 
cores must compare all prior execution results before a 
value becomes visible to other logical processor pairs. 
Lemma 1. In the absence of soft errors, input incoher-
ence cannot result in unsafe execution.
Proof: If no soft error occurred during program execu-
tion, condition (1) of safe execution (Definition 3) is 
satisfied. If input incoherence occurred, the register 
updates and memory writes on the vocal still satisfy 
conditions (2) and (3). Therefore, safe execution 
results.
Only undetected soft errors can result in unsafe 
state. Both input incoherence and soft errors can lead 
to divergent execution that must be detected and cor-
rected. However, Lemma 1 proves that input incoher-
ence alone cannot result in unsafe state. 
3.3.  Recovery
Definition 8 (Rollback recovery). When output com-
parison matches, the vocal's architectural state defines 
a new safe state that reflects updates from the com-
pared instruction results; otherwise, rollback recovery 
restores architectural state to prior safe state.
Because only the vocal core's architectural state 
defines new safe state, Reunion requires a mechanism 
to initialize the mute core's architectural registers to 
match the vocal core.
Definition 9 (Mute register initialization). The vocal 
and mute cores provide a mechanism to initialize the 
mute core's architectural register file with values iden-
tical to the vocal’s.
In the presence of input incoherence, naïve retry 
cannot guarantee forward progress because the condi-
tion causing input incoherence can persist. Incoherent 
cache blocks in the mute’s hierarchy can cause input 
incoherence until replaced by coherent values. Reunion 
addresses this problem with the synchronizing request:
Definition 10 (Synchronizing request). The synchro-
nizing request returns a single coherent value to both 
cores in the logical processor pair.We combine mute register initialization and the 
synchronizing request to create the re-execution proto-
col and then prove that the protocol guarantees forward 
progress following rollback recovery.
Definition 11 (Re-execution protocol). After rollback 
recovery, the mute architectural register file is initial-
ized to the values from the vocal. The logical processor 
pair then executes subsequent instructions non-specu-
latively (single-step), up to and including the first load 
or atomic memory operation. This operation is issued 
by both cores using the synchronizing request. After 
successful output comparison following this instruc-
tion, the logical pair resumes normal execution.
Lemma 2. (Forward Progress). The Reunion re-execu-
tion protocol always results in forward progress.
Proof: Rollback recovery is triggered either by a soft 
error, which does not persist, or input incoherence, 
which may persist. In the first case, re-execution elimi-
nates the error and results in successful output compar-
ison. In the second case, the mute register initialization 
and synchronizing request guarantee safe execution 
and safe state to the first load.
An implementation must provide the required 
behaviors of the execution model, but the system 
designer has latitude to optimize. In Section 4, a fast 
re-execution protocol implementation handles com-
mon case re-execution, while a slower version imple-
ments the rarely needed register file copy. 
4.  Reunion Microarchitecture
In this section, we first describe our baseline CMP 
and processor microarchitecture. We then discuss the 
changes required to implement the Reunion execution 
model in a shared cache controller and processor core.
4.1.  Baseline CMP 
Cache Hierarchy. We assume a baseline CMP 
with caches similar to Piranha [3]. A shared cache 
backs multiple write-back L1 caches private to each 
processor core. The shared cache controller accepts 
memory requests from all cores, coordinates on-chip 
coherence for blocks in private caches, and initiates 
off-chip transactions. The Reunion execution model 
can also be implemented at a snoopy cache interface 
for microarchitectures with private caches, such as 
Montecito [11]. 
Processor Microarchitecture. We assume the 
simplified out-of-order processor pipeline illustrated in 
Figure 3(a). Instructions are fetched and decoded in-
order, then issued, executed, and written back out-of-
order. In-order retirement stages inspect instructions 
for branch mis-speculation and exceptions, and write 
instruction results to the architectural register file, as in 
Pentium-M [18]. Stores initially occupy a speculative 
region of the store buffer. At retirement, the stores tran-
sition to a non-speculative region of the store buffer 
and drain to the L1 cache. 
This paper assumes single-threaded processor 
cores. Reunion can benefit from the efficient use of 
otherwise idle resources in SMT; however, cores must 
run only vocal or mute threads to prevent vocal con-
texts from consuming incoherent cache blocks. 
4.2.  Shared Cache Controller
The shared cache controller is responsible for 
implementing the vocal and mute semantics, phantom 
requests, and synchronizing requests. As in non-redun-
dant designs, the shared cache controller maintains 
coherence state (e.g., ownership and sharers lists) for 
all vocal cores. 
Because coherence is not necessary in mute 
caches, sharers lists never include mute caches and 
mute caches can never become exclusive or modified 
block owners. The coherence protocol behaves as if 
mute cores were absent from the system. To prevent 
values generated by mutes from being exposed to the 
system, the shared cache controller ignores all eviction 
and writeback requests originating from mute cores. 
Phantom requests.  All non-synchronizing 
requests from the mute to the shared cache controller 
are transformed into phantom requests. The phantom 
request produces a reply, although the value need not 
be coherent, or even valid. Phantom replies grant write 
permission within the mute hierarchy. 
The phantom request allows several “strengths”, 
depending on how diligently it searches for coherent 
data. The weakest phantom request strength, null, 
returns arbitrary data on any request (i.e., any L1 miss). 
While trivial to implement, null has severe perfor-
mance implications. A shared phantom request checks 
for hits in the shared cache and only returns arbitrary 
values on misses. Finally, the global phantom request 
achieves the best approximation of coherence. This 
request not only checks the shared cache, but also pri-
vate vocal caches and issues read requests to main 
memory for off-chip misses. In terms of complexity, 
this is a small departure from existing read requests. 
Unless otherwise noted, this paper assumes global 
phantom requests. 
Synchronizing requests. The shared cache con-
troller enforces coherence between vocal and mute 
cores only on synchronizing requests. Synchronizing 
requests flush the block from private caches (returning the vocal’s copy to the shared cache, while discarding 
the mute’s). When both requests have been received at 
L2, the shared cache controller initiates a coherent 
write transaction for the cache block on behalf of the 
pair. This obtains sufficient permission to complete 
instructions with both load and store semantics. After 
obtaining the coherent value, the shared cache control-
ler atomically replies to both the vocal and mute cores. 
The synchronizing request dominates recovery latency 
and is comparable to a shared cache hit. 
4.3.  Processor Pipeline
We now describe the processor pipeline changes 
for the Reunion execution model, output comparison 
and recovery. 
Safe state. The vocal processor core maintains 
safe state in the ARF, non-speculative store buffer and 
memory. Safe state can always be reached by the vocal 
by (1) retiring all instructions that have completed out-
put comparison without error to the architectural regis-
ter file and the non-speculative store buffer and (2) 
flushing all uncompared instructions from the pipeline 
(e.g., precise exception rollback). 
Output comparison. Instruction outputs must be 
compared before retiring to architectural state. The key 
addition is an in-order retirement stage called check. 
Check first generates a fingerprint—a hash of instruc-
tion results—from the entering instructions [21]. 
Check then compares its fingerprint with the partner 
core’s fingerprint to detect differences. A matching fin-
gerprint comparison retires the instruction and writes 
the instruction results to safe state in the architectural 
register file. A mismatch invokes recovery. Instructions 
cannot enter check speculatively; they must be guaran-
teed to retire if the instruction results match. 
Logically, the fingerprint captures all register 
updates, branch targets, store addresses, and store val-
ues. The number of instructions summarized by each 
fingerprint is a design parameter called the fingerprint 
interval; longer comparison intervals need proportion-
ally less comparison bandwidth. At the end of each fin-
gerprint interval, each core sends its fingerprint to the 
Figure 3. (a) Baseline pipeline and (b) a pipeline 
with fingerprint checks before retirement.
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partner core for comparison. We find empirically that 
the performance difference between intervals of one 
and fifty instructions is insignificant in our workloads, 
despite increased resource occupancy, because useful 
computation continues to the end of the interval. 
We combine the time required to generate, trans-
fer, and compare the fingerprint into a parameter called 
the comparison latency. Because the vocal and mute 
cores “swap” fingerprints, the comparison latency is 
the one-way latency between cores. This latency over-
laps with useful computation, at the cost of additional 
resource occupancy. The observed comparison latency, 
however, may be extended because the two cores are 
only loosely coupled in time. While the vocal and mute 
execute the same program, their relative progress may 
drift slightly in time, due to contention accessing 
shared resources (e.g., the L2 cache) and different pri-
vate cache contents. 
Fingerprint generation. In wide superscalar pro-
cessors, fingerprint generation bandwidth is a concern. 
The total state updates per cycle can exceed 256 bits of 
state, which exceeds what parallel CRC circuits can 
consume in a single clock. We solve this problem by 
leveraging a two-stage compression technique used in 
circuit testing [7], which places space-compressing 
parity trees before a time-compressing circuit, such as 
a parallel CRC [2] or multiple-input shift register 
(MISR) [7]. Parity trees reduce the raw M bits of state 
down to N bits of compressed state in a single clock 
cycle, which then feed the time-compressing circuit in 
the next cycle. Parity trees necessarily reduce the fin-
gerprint’s error detection coverage. Assuming all com-
binations of bit flips are equally likely, it can be shown 
that this two-stage technique doubles the aliasing prob-
ability. Therefore, the probability of aliasing is at most 
2-(N-1), where N is the width of a CRC circuit. The 
analysis in [21] shows that a 16-bit CRC already 
exceeds industry system error coverage goals by an 
order of magnitude.
Re-execution. Upon detection of differences 
between the vocal and mute, the logical processor pair 
starts the re-execution protocol illustrated in Figure 4. 
To optimize for the common case, the protocol is 
divided into two phases. The first handles detected soft 
errors and detected input incoherence errors. The sec-
ond phase addresses the extremely rare case where 
Figure 4. The re-execution protocol.
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Both vocal and mute cores invoke rollback-recov-
ery using precise exception support and, in the com-
mon case, restore to identical safe states in their 
architectural register files. Both cores then non-specu-
latively single-step execution up to the first memory 
read. Each core then issues a synchronizing memory 
request—eliminating input incoherence for the 
requested cache block—and compares a fingerprint for 
all instructions in the interval. Following comparison, 
the re-execution protocol has made forward progress 
by at least one instruction. The cores then continue nor-
mal speculative, out-of-order execution.
If the first phase fails output comparison, the sec-
ond phase starts. The vocal copies its architectural reg-
ister file to the mute and the pair proceeds with re-
execution, as in the first phase. Because the vocal core 
always maintains safe state in the absence of soft 
errors, this will correctly recover from all incoherence 
errors. If the cause was a soft error missed by finger-
print aliasing, the protocol cannot recover safe state 
and therefore must trigger a failure (e.g., detected, 
uncorrectable error interrupt). The re-execution proto-
col can be implemented in microcode.
External interrupts. External interrupts must be 
scheduled and handled at the same point in program 
execution on both cores. Fingerprint comparison pro-
vides a mechanism for synchronizing the two cores on 
a single instruction. Reunion handles external inter-
rupts by replicating the request to both the vocal and 
mute cores. The vocal core chooses a fingerprint inter-
val at which to service the interrupt. Both processors 
service the interrupt after comparing and retiring the 
preceding instructions. 
Hardware cost. Fingerprint comparison requires 
queues to store outstanding fingerprints, a channel to 
send fingerprints to the partner core, hash circuitry, and 
a comparator. The fingerprint queues can be sized to 
balance latency, area, and power. The check stage 
delays writing results into the architectural register file. 
The results can be stored in a circular buffer during the 
check stage or read again at retirement.
4.4.  Serializing Check Overhead
Instructions with serializing semantics—such as 
traps, memory barriers, atomic memory operations, 
and non-idempotent memory accesses—impose a per-
formance penalty in all redundant execution microar-
chitectures. Serializing instructions must stall pipeline 
retirement for a full comparison latency, because (1) all 
older instructions must be compared and retired before 
the serializing instruction can execute and (2) no 
younger instructions can execute until the serializing 
instruction retires. 
Upon encountering a serializing instruction, the 
fingerprint interval immediately ends to allow older 
instructions to retire. The fingerprint is updated to 
include state that must be checked before executing the 
serializing instruction (e.g.,  uncacheable load 
addresses). Once the older instructions retire, the seri-
alizing instruction completes its execution and check. 
This comparison exposes timing differences between 
the cores (due to loosely-coupled execution) and the 
entire comparison latency. Normal execution continues 
once the serializing instruction retires.
5.  Evaluation
We evaluate Reunion using FLEXUS, which pro-
vides cycle-accurate, full-system simulation of a chip 
multiprocessor [24]. FLEXUS extends Virtutech Simics 
with cycle-accurate models of an out-of-order proces-
sor and memory system. 
We simulate a CMP with four logical processors: 
four cores for non-redundant models and eight cores 
for redundant models. We assume on-chip cache band-
width scales in proportion with the number of cores. 
Our CMP model uses a cache hierarchy derived from 
Piranha [3]. For Reunion, the vocal and mute L1 cache 
tags and data are independently modeled. We list sys-
tem parameters in Table 1. 
Table 2 lists our commercial and scientific appli-
cation suite. All workloads run on Solaris 8. We 
include the TPC-C v3.0 OLTP workload on two com-
mercial database management systems, IBM DB2 v8 
Enterprise Server Edition, and Oracle 10g Enterprise 
Database Server. We tune the database to maximize 
performance of our non-redundant system model. 
We select three representative queries from the 
TPC-H decision support system (DSS) workload, 
Table 1. Simulated baseline CMP parameters.
Processor Cores 4 logical processors, UltraSPARC III ISA
4 GHz 12-stage pipeline; out-of-order
4-wide dispatch / retirement
256-entry RUU; 64-entry store buffer
L1 Cache 64KB split I/D, 2-way, 2-cycle load to use, 
2 rd, 1 wr ports, 64-byte lines, 32 MSHRs
Shared L2 Cache 16MB unified, 4 banks, 8-way, 
35-cycle hit latency, 64-byte lines, 
crossbar to L1s, 64 MSHRs
ITLB 128 entry, 2-way; 8K page
DTLB 512 entry 2-way; 8K page
 Memory 3 GB, 60 ns access latency, 64 banksshowing scan-dominated, join-dominated, and mixed 
behavior. We evaluate web server performance with 
the SPECweb99 benchmark on Apache HTTP Server 
v2.0 and Zeus Web Server v4.3. We report the server 
performance of web servers saturated by separate cli-
ents over a high-bandwidth link. We also include four 
parallel shared-memory scientific applications that 
exhibit a range of memory access patterns. 
We use a sampling approach that draws many brief 
measurements over 10 to 30 seconds of simulated time 
for OLTP and web applications, the complete query 
execution for DSS, and a single iteration for scientific 
applications. We target 95% confidence intervals of 
±5% error on change in performance using matched-
pair comparison [24]. We launch measurements from 
checkpoints with warmed caches and branch predic-
tors, then run for 100,000 cycles to warm pipeline and 
queue state prior to 50,000 cycles of measurement. We 
collect the aggregate user instructions committed per 
cycle as our performance metric, which is proportional 
to overall system throughput. We compare fingerprints 
on every instruction. We do not inject soft errors; how-
ever, input incoherence events, output comparison, and 
recovery are modeled in detail.
5.1.  Baseline Performance 
We evaluate the baseline performance of redun-
dant execution in a CMP for a representative system 
using strict input replication (“Strict”) and Reunion. 
Strict models a system with strict input replica-
tion, fingerprint comparison across cores for error 
detection, and recovery within the ROB (as described 
for Reunion in Section 4.3). Strict serves as an oracle 
performance model for all strict input replication 
designs with recovery. It imposes no performance pen-
alty for input replication (e.g., lockstepped processor 
cores or an LVQ with no resource hazards). However, 
we model the penalties from buffering instructions dur-
Table 2. Application parameters.
Commercial Workloads
DB2 OLTP 100 warehouses (10GB), 64 clients, 450MB BP
Oracle OLTP 100 warehouses (10GB), 16 clients, 1.4GB SGA
DB2 DSS Qry 1 (scan); Qry 2 (join); Qry 17 (balanced)
100 warehouses (10GB), 450MB BP
Apache Web 16K connections, fastCGI, worker thread model
Zeus Web 16K connections, fastCGI
Scientific Workloads
em3d 768K nodes, degree 2, span 5, 15% remote
moldyn 19,652 molecules, boxsize 17, 2.56M max iters.
ocean 258x258 grid, 9600s relax, 20K res., errtol 1e-7
sparse 4096x4096 matrix
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Strict Reunioning check. The Reunion model demonstrates the per-
formance of relaxed input replication and fingerprint 
comparison and recovery. To support recovery within 
the speculative window, both systems check instruction 
results before irrevocably retiring them to the architec-
tural register file and non-speculative store buffer. 
Figure 5 shows the baseline performance of both 
models normalized to the performance of a non-redun-
dant baseline CMP, with a ten-cycle comparison 
latency between cores. As compared to the non-redun-
dant baseline, the strict model has a 5% and 2% aver-
age performance penalty for commercial and scientific 
workloads, respectively, while Reunion shows 10% 
and 8% average respective performance penalties. The 
low performance overhead of Reunion demonstrates 
that relaxed input replication is a viable redundant exe-
cution model. In the following sections, we explore the 
performance of these execution models in more detail. 
5.2.  Checking Overhead
We first examine the performance of Strict to 
understand the performance penalties of checking 
redundant executions across cores in a CMP. First, seri-
alizing instructions cause the entire pipeline to stall for 
the check because no further instructions can execute 
until these instructions complete. The check fundamen-
tally extends this stall penalty: as the comparison 
latency increases, the retirement stalls must also 
increase. Second, pipeline occupancy increases from 
instructions in check occupying additional ROB capac-
ity in the speculative window. For workloads that bene-
fit from large instruction windows, this decreases 
opportunities to exploit memory-level parallelism 
(MLP) or perform speculative execution. 
Figure 6(a) shows the average performance impact 
from checking in Strict for each workload class over a 
range of on-chip comparison latencies, normalized to a non-redundant baseline. At a zero-cycle comparison 
latency, the workloads do not show a statistically sig-
nificant performance difference from non-redundant 
execution. The performance penalty increases linearly 
with increasing comparison latency. Both commercial 
and scientific workloads exhibit similar sensitivity to 
the comparison latency; however, the mechanisms are 
different. 
In commercial workloads, the dominant perfor-
mance effect comes from frequent serializing instruc-
tions. With increased comparison intervals, the number 
of these events remains constant, but the stall penalty 
increases. At forty cycles, the average performance 
penalty from checking is 17%. 
In contrast, the scientific workloads suffer from 
increased reorder buffer occupancy because they can 
saturate this resource, which decreases MLP. At a com-
parison latency of forty cycles, the average perfor-
mance penalty is 11%. While space constraints limit 
more detailed analysis, larger speculation windows 
(e.g., thousands of instructions, as in checkpointing 
architectures [1]) completely eliminate the resource 
occupancy bottleneck, but cannot relieve stalls from 
serializing instructions.
5.3.  Reunion Performance
We first evaluate the performance penalty of 
relaxed input replication under Reunion, then explore 
Reunion’s sensitivity to comparison latencies. Unlike 
the strict input replication model, vocal and mute exe-
cution in Reunion is only loosely coupled across the 
cores. For non-serializing instructions, these differ-
ences can be absorbed by buffering in the check stage. 
However, serializing instructions expose the loose cou-
pling because neither core can make further progress 
until the slower core arrives at and compares the 
instruction. This introduces additional retirement stalls Figure 5. Baseline performance of redundant execution with strict input replication and Reunion normalized 
to a non-redundant baseline, with a 10-cycle comparison latency.
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Scientificthat affect both cores, on top of the comparison over-
heads discussed above. Figure 6(b) shows the perfor-
mance of Reunion for a range of comparison latencies. 
Reunion’s performance is determined by checking 
overheads, loose coupling, and input incoherence.
The first observation from Figure 6(b) is that, 
unlike Strict, Reunion has a performance penalty from 
loose coupling and relaxed input replication at a zero-
cycle comparison latency. For commercial workloads, 
the serializing events expose the loose coupling, 
because one core must wait for its partner to catch up 
before comparing fingerprints. For scientific work-
loads, contention at the shared cache increases the 
effective memory latency, decreasing performance. 
This result shows that the baseline performance pen-
alty of Reunion’s relaxed input replication is small—
on average, 5% and 6% for commercial and scientific 
workloads, respectively. 
The second observation in Figure 6(b) is that at 
non-zero comparison latencies, performance converges 
towards the limits set by the strict input replication 
model. As the comparison latency grows, the compari-
son overhead and resource occupancies dominate the 
performance, because more time is spent waiting on 
the comparison than resolving loose coupling delays. 
At a forty-cycle comparison latency, the average per-
formance penalty is 22% and 13% for commercial and 
scientific workloads, respectively, which closely fol-
lows the Strict model’s trend. This result shows that the 
primary performance impact with larger comparison 
latencies comes from fundamental limits of checking 
and recovery, instead of relaxed input replication.
5.4.  Input Incoherence
We now provide empirical evidence to demon-
strate that input incoherence events in Reunion are uncommon. Table 3 shows the frequency of input inco-
herence events per million retired instructions in 
Reunion for all three phantom request strengths, with a 
ten-cycle comparison latency. As a point of compari-
son, we juxtapose the input incoherence events with 
another common system event with a comparable per-
formance penalty: the translation lookaside buffer 
(TLB) miss. 
We first consider Reunion with global phantom 
requests. Recall that global phantom requests initiate 
on- and off-chip non-coherent reads on behalf of the 
mute. As shown, our workloads encounter input inco-
herence events infrequently with global phantom 
requests, while data and instruction TLB misses gener-
ally occur orders of magnitude more frequently. From 
this data we conclude that input incoherence events 
are, in fact, uncommon in our workloads. Furthermore, 
even with relaxed input replication, the penalty of 
recovery is overshadowed by other system events.
Next, we investigate whether choices for weaker 
phantom requests from Section 4.2 are effective. The 
data for shared and null phantom requests in Table 3
show that input incoherence events are three to four 
Table 3. Input incoherence events for each 
phantom request strength, TLB miss frequency.
 Per 1M instructions
Input Incoherence
Workload Global Shared Null TLB Misses
Apache 0.9 3,818 8,620 1,973
Zeus 0.2 1,818 5,456 1,654
DB2 OLTP 0.7 5,340 16,197 2,492
Oracle OLTP 0.6 4,578 17,140 3,297
DB2 DSS Q1 21.1 1,909 4,004 206
DB2 DSS Q2 0.7 4,852 7,991 1,040
DB2 DSS Q17 1.5 4,863 10,466 1,089
Avg. Scientific 0.4 17,406 22,607 239Figure 6.  Performance sensitivity to the comparison interval of (a) strict input replication and (b) Reunion.
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US III Software-managed TLBorders of magnitude more frequent than with global
phantom request strengths and in both cases are more 
frequent than TLB misses. These high frequencies 
indicate that recovery from input incoherence can 
become a bottleneck with weaker phantom requests.
Figure 7(a) compares the performance of the three 
phantom request strengths with a 10-cycle comparison 
latency, normalized to the non-redundant baseline. 
Both shared and null phantom requests incur a severe 
performance impact from frequent recoveries. Shared
phantom requests capture most mute L1 misses 
because of the high shared-cache hit rate. One notable 
exception is em3d, whose working set exceeds the 
shared cache and therefore frequently reads arbitrary 
data instead of initiating off-chip reads. The null phan-
tom request policy has a severe performance impact for 
all workloads because each L1 read miss is followed 
by input incoherence rollbacks. 
The analysis of input incoherence in this section 
shows that global phantom requests are effective in 
reducing input incoherence events to negligible levels 
in our workloads. Furthermore, the weaker phantom 
request strengths increase the frequency of input inco-
herence to levels that cause a severe performance 
impact. 
5.5.  Serialization Overhead
Finally, we identify the importance of architectur-
ally-defined serializing instructions to redundant exe-
cution performance. In the system we evaluate, 
serializing instructions are traps, memory barriers, and 
non-idempotent memory requests. Many of these 
events are inherent in the workloads, such as memory 
barriers needed to protect critical sections, while oth-
ers, such as system traps, are specified by the instruc-
tion set architecture. 
The results presented up to this point in the paper 
have eliminated the dominant source of system-spe-cific traps in our baseline UltraSPARC III architecture: 
the software-managed TLB miss handler. In commer-
cial workloads, the “fast TLB miss handler” is invoked 
frequently (see Table 3), due to their large instruction 
and data footprints. The handler function includes two 
traps, for entry and exit, and executes three non-idem-
potent memory requests to the memory management 
unit (MMU).
Figure 7(b) contrasts the average performance of 
commercial workloads with a hardware-managed TLB 
model and the architecturally-defined UltraSPARC III 
software-managed TLB handler. As the comparison 
interval increases, the contribution of the serializing 
checks is readily apparent—increasing the perfor-
mance impact to 28% at a forty-cycle comparison 
latency. While this result is from Reunion, a compara-
ble impact also occurs with strict input replication. 
Strong memory consistency models can also affect 
checking performance. In contrast with Sun TSO, the 
Sequential Consistency (SC) memory consistency 
model places memory barrier semantics on every store 
(5-10% of the dynamic instructions in our workloads). 
Hence, every store serializes retirement. We observe an 
average performance loss of over 60% at 40 cycles due 
to store serialization with SC. 
The results in this section underscore the impor-
tance of considering serializing instructions, especially 
architecture-specific ones, in the performance of 
redundant execution microarchitectures. 
6.  Conclusion
Designs for redundant execution in multiproces-
sors must address input replication and output compar-
ison. Strict input replication requires significant 
changes to the pipeline. We observe that the input inco-
herence targeted by strict input replication is infre-
quent. We propose the Reunion execution model, 
which uses relaxed input replication, backed by light-Figure 7. (a) Reunion performance with different phantom request strengths and (b) Reunion average 
performance for commercial workloads with hardware and software-managed TLBs.
(a) (b)
Web OLTP DSS Scientific
weight error recovery within the processor’s specula-
tive window. The model preserves the existing memory 
system, including the coherence protocol and memory 
consistency model. We show that the overhead of 
relaxed input replication in Reunion is only 5% and 6% 
for commercial and scientific workloads, respectively.
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